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Abstract This paper presents a system developed in Linux aiming the protection of 
local area networks containing Windows workstations against malicious agents. 
The developed solution, named LIV - Linux Integrated Viruswall, besides filtering 
SMTP, HTTP and FTP traffic destined to the protected network, is capable of 
detecting malicious agents propagation in the local area network using a technique 
that we call "sharing-trap". Compromised workstations are isolated from the 
network and their users are notified, stopping the malicious agent's spread. Results 
collected from a network protected by LIV, containing thousands of Windows 
workstations, are presented and discussed. This paper includes information about 
the recent incident caused by MyDoom worm. 
1 Introduction 
Malicious agents can be defined as computer programs that operate on behalf of a 
potential intruder, aiding it on the activity of attacking a system or a network [1]. Once 
limited to damages in the compromised systems, modern malicious agents acquired new 
characteristics, as the capability of transmitting private information to the program 
author, the possibility of remotelly control infected machines and the use of a 
compromised group of computers on a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. 
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During the year of 2001, the economical impact caused by malicious agents was 
estimated at $13.2 billion [2]. In 2003, only W32/Sobig.F [3], W32/Nachi [4], 
W32/Blaster [5] and W32/Slammer [6] worms were responsible for economical losses 
estimated at $3.25 billion. These values show the growing importance of the adoption of 
actions that reduce damage caused by the malicious agents on systems and on computer 
networks. 
The traditionally proposed model for protection against malicious agents [7] consists of 
three protection layers: the first of them acting on the Internet gateway, the second 
protecting the file and mail servers and the third protecting the workstations. In spite of 
the immunity propitiated by this model, a basic vulnerability persists: The propagation 
speed of new malicious agents, unknown by the antiviruses that work on three layers of 
the model, allows that apparently "protected" networks and workstations continue being 
infected [8]. 
In this work, we present an Internet gateway solution that aim to protect local area 
networks against malicious agents. The solution, named LIV, Linux Integrated 
Viruswall, is endowed with features implemented in other products [9,10], such as 
SMTP, HTTP and FTP-traffic filtering [11,12,13], and also incorporates new 
functionalities. Among those new functionalities, we highlight: the use of the sharing-
trap to detect malicious agents spreading in the local area network, analysis of the 
network traffic generated by the workstations to determine the infected ones, isolation of 
compromised workstations from the network and the use of a proxy server as a 
communication channel between the protection system and the users of the workstations. 
Therefore, LIV is not limited to merely preventing the contamination of the protected 
network. In the case where a malicious agent gets to enter in the network, deceiving the 
traditional defense mechanisms, LIV will act limitating its propagation on the LAN. 
LIV is constituted of a group of 10 processes, named ISPAMA - Integrated System for 
Protection Against Malicious Agents. ISPAMA coordinates the behavior of CIFS 
(Common Internet File System [14] ), SMTP , HTTP and proxy servers. The operation 
of an antivirus scanner is also controlled by ISPAMA. LIV uses the firewall functions of 
the Linux kernel, via iptables [15], and a database manager for the storage and 
information exchanging among the various ISPAMA processes. The use of a CIFS 
server made possible the creation of a network sharing (sharing-trap), published and 
made available, without access restrictions, to Windows workstations. The sharing-trap 
aims to cause the replication of malicious agents to the LIV. Machines that transmit 
malicious agents to the sharing-trap are considered infected and are isolated from the 
network. The SMTP server acts in the analysis of the e-mail attachments, preventing the 
entrance of known malicious agents, as well as putting suspect files in quarantine. The 
HTTP server is used for the LIV configuration and, together with the proxy server, acts 
in the analysis of the downloads made by users of the protected network. The HTTP 
server and the proxy server are also used as a communication channel between the LIV 
and the users of the network, allowing, for instance, notification of users of the 
compromised machines in case of infection. The Linux firewall acts in the isolation 
process of the compromised machines and in the generation of logs related to the 
workstations’ traffic. These logs will be stored later in the LIV database and analyzed by 
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the ISPAMA processes. The log analysis is another method used by the LIV to discover 
the infected workstations in the network. 
After this introduction, we present in the Section 2 the architecture of the LIV. In 
Section 3, we describe the operation of the ISPAMA processes. Section 4 details the 
operation of CIFS server and the sharing-trap. Section 5 discusses the results obtained 
by LIV in the recent W32/MyDoom [16] incident, reserving to Section 6 the conclusions 
of the present work. 
2 LIV Architecture 
The current version of LIV is implemented in Slackware 9.0 Linux distribution [17]. 
However, there is no known incompatibility with the implementation of LIV in other 
distributions, since servers and programs that were used in the solution are also available 
on these other distributions. It is important to emphasize that not all packages used by 
LIV are present in Slackware 9.0 distribution. Furthermore, some of these packages were 
substituted by newer versions, or recompiled to support options not available in the 
distribution version. 
At this moment, LIV is protecting a network containing thousands of Windows 
workstations. The protected network is connected to a single 6 Mbps Internet link. In this 
particular case, LIV was implemented on a monoprocessed CISC server, with 512Mb of 
RAM, presenting a quite satisfactory performance. Some results collected from this 
network configuration are presented on Section 5. 
Ten processes run in the LIV server, and these processes are responsible for the 
implementation of the protection against malicious agents, sharing information amongst 
themselves by the use of the LIV database. The group of ten processes plus the database 
is denominated ISPAMA - Integrated System for Protection Against Malicious Agents. 
The specific operation of each ISPAMA’s process will be discussed in the Section 3. 
Besides the ISPAMA processes, several other servers are executed in the LIV machine. 
ISPAMA coordinates the behavior of these servers and, when necessary, activates the 
functions of the Linux firewall to limit the spread of malicious agents throughout the 
local area network. A scanner is used to make verifications on e-mail attachments and on 
downloads. 
The applications managed by ISPAMA are available for several Linux distributions. 
These programs are a CIFS server, implemented by Samba [18], a SMTP server, 
implemented by Sendmail [19], a HTTP server, implemented by Apache [20], and a 
proxy server, implemented by Squid [21]. It is also necessary to activate the firewall 
functions of the Linux kernel. Figure 1 shows the general architecture of LIV.  
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Figure 1: LIV Architecture 
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As shown on Figure 1, one LIV server can exchange information with another. The use 
of a larger number of LIV servers make it possible to increase the capacity of limiting 
malicious agents spread throughout the LAN, in the case where some of them get to 
enter in the protected network. If a machine is contaminated, LIV will isolate it from the 
network, preventing that the malicious agents access shares of other workstations or the 
mail servers of the organization and continue the propagation process on the network. 
The isolation is implemented in the LIV servers by reconfiguring the Linux firewall. 
Additionally, LIV allows the use of external insulating modules, that are responsible for 
the programming of departmental routers of the organization. The external modules 
instruct routers to filter the packages originated from infected workstations. 
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Figure 2: Typical network topology using LIV. 
LIV can be used in simple or in complex network topologies. In the simplest network 
topology, the organization has no Internet servers and only one single LIV is used. In 
this case, only two network interfaces (LAN and Internet) are needed [22]. Figure 2 
shows a more complex situation. In this example, an organization is subdivided in units 
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and departments. The organization has a single Internet link shared by all units, and each 
unit has its own Internet servers, including mail servers, and a LIV server. The LIV 
server is connected to the unit's LAN and to the Internet servers hosted on that unit. 
Additionally, the unit's LIV is connected to the Internet gateway network and to a 
communication network constituted of all LIV servers of the organization. This LIV 
network is used to share information concerning infected workstations and banned e-
mail address. 
In the next section, we will describe ISPAMA processes in detail. 
3 ISPAMA Processes 
ISPAMA controls all decisions taken by LIV. The ISPAMA processes are responsible 
for reading logs generated by Linux and inserting the records in the LIV database. Based 
in log analysis, the LIV tries to determine if there are infected workstations in the 
protected network. Accesses to the sharing-trap and the e-mail attachments verification 
are also used by LIV to identify infected workstations. Some other processes perform 
tasks such as replication control, isolation and collection of performance data. 
3.1 Log Reader 
The log reader stores on the database information generated by the firewall Linux and by 
the mail server. Only relevant information to the isolation decision is stored. LIV 
controls the number of log reader processes running according to the amount of records 
generated by Linux.  
3.2 Firewall Log Analyzer 
LIV examines the traffic generated by the workstations based on rules defined by its 
administrator. The rules define the port and the protocol that LIV will monitor in the 
network, allowing the log reader to configure the firewall so that it will start registering 
the packets related to the new rules. Besides the port and the protocol, the rules contain 
other attributes that are periodically anallyzed by the firewall log analyzer. When one of 
the defined attribute values is exceeded, the workstation that generated these packets will 
be isolated of the network. Table I summarizes the attributes used in firewall rules. 
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Attribute Explanation 
Destination Port 
(PORT) 
Destination ports of the connections (TCP protocol) or datagrams 
(UDP protocol) that will be examined by the rule. 
Protocol Protocol used by the packets examined in this rule (UDP or 
TCP). 
Limit of Connections 
destined to LIV 
Server (LCLIV) 
Defines a limit to the number of connections destined to the LIV 
server that a workstation is allowed to establish using stipulated 
port/protocol in the interval specified by the rule 
Limit of Connections 
destined to Intranet 
(LCIN) 
Defines a limit to the number of connections destined to Intranet 
addresses that a workstation is allowed to establish using 
stipulated port/protocol in the interval specified by the rule 
Limit of Connections 
destined to Internet 
(LCOUT) 
Defines a limit to the number of connections destined to Internet 
addresses that a workstation is allowed to establish using 
stipulated port/protocol in the interval specified by the rule 
Limit of Periodical 
Accesses (LPA) 
Defines a limit to the number of periodical connections that a 
workstation is allowed to establish using stipulated port/protocol 
in the interval specified by the rule 
Interval Time interval used to restrict queries sent to LIV database. Only 
log records generated in the rule interval are computed when 
verifying the traffic generated by a workstation 
Table I: Firewall rules attributes. 
3.3 SMTP Server Log Analyzer 
The SMTP server log analysis is similar to that described in the previous section for the 
firewall log analysis. The main difference between them consists on the type of address 
analyzed. Firewall analysis works with IP addresses of the workstations, and the SMTP 
server analysis works with e-mail addresses. The attributes of the mail server rules also 
differ from the firewall ones and are presented in Table 2. 
Attribute Explanation 
Distinct Originator 
Addresses (DOA) 
Defines how many distinct origin e-mail addresses one 
workstation can use in the defined rule interval 
Recipients Limit 
(RLM) 
Defines the maximum number of distinct recipients in all the e-
mail messages sent by a workstation in the rule interval 
Messages per 
Recipient (MPR) 
Defines how many messages can be sent by one workstation to 
the same recipient in the rule interval 
External Domain 
Limit (EDL) 
Defines the maximum number of messages sent by a workstation 
using an external domain in the originator address 
Interval Time interval used to restrict queries sent to LIV database. Only 
log records generated in the rule interval are computed when 
verifying the traffic generated by a workstation 
Table II: SMTP server rules attributes. 
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If the administrator wishes, some of the rule's attributes can be ignored by LIV in the log 
analysis processes. 
3.4 Insulator 
The insulator process is responsible for configuring the Linux firewall whenever a 
workstation is isolated or reintegrated into the network. The firewall is also configured if 
the LIV's rules have been changed. The isolation filters the traffic generated by infected 
workstation, allowing only accesses to essential services, such as name resolution, World 
Wide Web (WWW) to intranet servers and access to proxy ports on LIV servers. 
Besides interacting with firewall, the insulator alters the proxy server configuration so 
that it will start blocking the access of infected workstations to the Internet. Whenever an 
Internet access is denied, the proxy server will inform the workstation user about the 
infection and the isolation of his machine. The last insulator function is to alter the 
SMTP server configuration so that it will temporarily reject the reception of e-mail sent 
by addresses that are transmitting malicious agents to the protected network.  
3.5 Attachment Analyzer 
Each e-mail originated or destined to the protected network is analyzed by LIV. This 
analysis will initially verify the existence of malicious agents in attachments. If some 
malicious agent is found, the action taken by LIV will depend on the address of the 
sender of the message. If the sender's IP address belongs to the intranet, the workstation 
will be isolated from the network. Otherwise, the sender's e-mail address will be put in a 
SMTP server rejection list. If LIV does not find malicious agent in attachments, it will 
perform a second analysis, that consists of removing dangerous existing attachments in 
the message. The LIV's administrator defines which kind of files will be accepted or 
refused in attachments. Usually, executables, batch files and similar ones should be 
refused. 
3.6 Other ISPAMA Process 
The five remaining ISPAMA processes are the following: Sharing-trap access analyzer, 
downloads analyzer, replicator, collector of performance information and daily 
maintenance. The sharing-trap access analyzer will be discussed in the next section and 
the operation of the other four processes will be summarized now.  
The download analyzer performs a scan operation in files downloaded via the proxy 
server, being an incumbency of the LIV's administrator to determine which file 
extensions will be examined and which will not. The replicator process periodically 
sends information about infected workstations and about the banned e-mails addresses to 
LIV partners in the protected network. The function of the process collector of 
performance information is to obtain data about the CPU usage and memory resources 
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on the LIV server. The collected data are presented graphically in the LIV WEB 
interface. Finally, the daily maintenance process accomplishes tasks like exclusion of old 
log records stored in LIV database and the removal of files put in quarantine on server’s 
disk. 
4 The Sharing-trap 
The sharing-trap is a technique used by LIV to detect workstations compromised by 
malicious agents that are capable of spreading themselves throughout local area network. 
Any workstation can access the sharing-trap. There are no access control, therefore LIV 
will accept access independently of the network credentials informed to the CIFS server. 
Additionally, if a workstation searches for a sharing name inexistent in the CIFS server, 
LIV will map this access to the sharing-trap. Figure 3 illustrates how a Windows 
workstation sees the sharing-trap in the network. 
Figure 3 Sharing-trap accessed using a Windows Workstation. 
When an access to the sharing-trap is concluded, CIFS server runs a LIV process that 
scans for malicious agents. LIV will isolate the workstation that accomplished the last 
access to the sharing-trap if some malicious agent is found in the scan. The files of the 
sharing-trap are restored in the case of some alteration is detected during the analysis 
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process. Figure 4 shows the key configuration of the Samba server to implement the 
sharing-trap. 
1. [global]
2.  workgroup = EXAMPLE
3.  netbios name = LIV
4.  server string = Linux Integrated Viruswall
5.  interfaces = 192.0.2.0/255.255.252.0
6.  bind interfaces only = Yes
7.  security = DOMAIN
8.  encrypt passwords = Yes
9.  map to guest = Bad Password
10.  password server = EX_DC1, EX_DC2
11.  username map = /etc/samba/private/smbalias
12.  deadtime = 2
13.  wins server = EXAMPLE:192.0.2.10
14.  default service = C
15.  remote announce = 192.0.2.10/EXAMPLE 192.0.2.11/EXAMPLE
16. 
17. [C]
18.  comment = LIV Sharing Trap
19.  path = /usr/local/liv/armadilha
20.  admin users = nobody
21.  read only = No
22.  guest ok = Yes
23.  root postexec = /usr/local/liv/cifs %I &
24.  volume = LIV
25. fstype = FAT
26. dos filemode = Yes
27. dos filetimes = Yes
28. dos filetime resolution = Yes
 
Figure 4. Key configuration of the Samba server to implement the sharing-trap. 
Figure 4 shows the case of a LIV server that is member of the Microsoft domain 
EXAMPLE. Line 9 of the configuration file instructs the Samba server to map invalid 
user accesses to a guest account. This guest account can access the sharing-trap "C", 
configured by the lines 18-28. Line 14 redirects accesses to inexistent shares names to 
the sharing-trap. Line 22 allows guest access to the sharing-trap, and line 20 grants 
administrative privileges to the guest account. Line 23 states that sharing-trap access 
analyzer is activated after each share access. 
In the next section, we will discuss the results obtained by LIV in two months of 
operation protecting a network composed of thousands of Windows workstations. 
5 Results 
The results presented in this section were obtained in a network containing more than 
6,000 Windows workstations distributed by approximately 180 remote places in the 
Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte. The network topology is similar to that presented 
in Figure 2. The data were collected in the period from January 14, when LIV was 
implanted in the network, until February 26, 2004. During this period, LIV analyzed 
691,184 e-mails, removing 6,658 malicious agents found in attachments. The amount of 
scanned downloads has summed 40,467, on which 38 were infected. Figure 5 presents 
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incidents involving all known variants of MyDoom, Bagle [23] and NetSky [24] in the 
protected network with a period of one day for each interval. In all these cases, LIV 
removed the malicious agents from the message, replacing the attachment with a 
warning message. After that, the warning message was sent for the sender and for the 
recipient of the e-mail. 
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Figure 5. MyDoom, Bagle and NetSky removed from e-mail attachments with a daily period. 
Table III presents some data obtained from LIV database about MyDoom. 
GENERAL DATA 
MyDooms removed from attachments 4253 
Number of infected machines in the protected network 31 (0.52 %) 
Propagation peak 04/02/2004 
Percentage of infected e-mails in the peak of propagation 6.05 % 
SOURCE OF E-MAIL MESSAGES CONTAINING MYDOOM 
LAN (sent by the 31 infected machines before isolation) 3275 (77 %) 
Internet 978 (23 %) 
→ Average number of e-mails sent from infected machines before the 
isolation (with an maximum interval of 5 minutes):  
105.65 
SOURCE OF E-MAIL MESSAGES CONTAINING MYDOOM AND COMING 
FROM THE INTERNET 
Brazil 881 (90,1%) 
Other Countries 97 (9,9%) 
Table III. Information concerning MyDoom collected from LIV database. 
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An inquiry made in some of the 31 stations infected by MyDoom in the protected 
network had demonstrated that these machines were used in others networks (most of 
them are notebooks) or that they have also been connected to the Internet via dial-up. In 
some cases, it was reported that machines were compromised when reading infected 
messages in Internet webmails, placed outside the LIV protection perimeter. This occurs 
because some webmails are incompatible with the download protection method used by 
LIV. 
Another significant result of LIV refers to the performed isolation operations. The 
network where LIV is operating had hundreds of infected machines prior to the LIV 
implantation. On January 14, when LIV has started its operation, practically all of them 
were immediately isolated. From January 14 until February 26, LIV accomplished 672 
isolation operations. In 376 of these isolations, the network support team of the 
organization was able to determine with reliability whether the machine was or not 
infected. In 91.76% of these cases, the machine was really infected. The 8.24% 
remaining constitute the false positives, when LIV isolates a machine that is not infected. 
A false positive can occur due to wrong network configuration at workstations, or due to 
improper LIV parameters setting. Typically, when LIV server is configured so that it 
will be able to detect and isolate a higher number of infected workstations, it will also 
cause more false positives. 
In the next Section we present the conclusions of this work. 
6 Conclusions 
We presented a system for protection against malicious agents that acts on the Internet 
gateway of the network. The solution, named LIV - Linux Integrated Viruswall, is 
capable of preventing malicious agents entrance in the protected network as well as 
detecting already infected workstations. Compromised workstations containing 
malicious agents are isolated from the network and their users are notified. LIV 
introduces new features in comparison with other solutions. First, LIV uses the sharing-
trap technique to detect malicious agents spread through LAN. Additionally, LIV 
analyzes the network traffic generated by workstations to verify if they are 
compromised. Another innovative feature is the use of the proxy server as a 
communication channel with the users of the infected machines, making it possible to 
inform them when a malicious agent infect their machines even when there is no local 
antivirus installed. 
After 44 days of its implantation on a network composed of more than 6,000 Windows 
workstations, LIV had already blocked the entrance of approximately 6,700 malicious 
agents in the protected network. LIV had also detected the infection of at least 345 
machines, isolating them from network, and avoiding the malicious agents spread. In the 
analyzed period, 368 attached files had been put in quarantine. Many of these files 
contained malicious agents still unknown at the time in which they were analyzed by the 
LIV's scanner.  
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The features incorporated to LIV, together with the results obtained, demonstrate that it 
is possible to significantly increase the security of a computer network against malicious 
agents by using a regular computer with no special hardware, acting in the gateway of 
the protected network. 
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